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9.1 Introduction
The interplay between monetary policy and asset prices is a subject of
longstanding interest in ﬁnancial economics. Often, but not always, the fo-
cus is directed at trying to understand how monetary policy, or shocks to
policy, impacts asset prices—whether these be the prices of equities,
bonds, property, or currencies. Less often, the focus is on how, or should,
asset prices inﬂuence the conduct of monetary policy. This chapter takes a
diﬀerent approach. We ask whether the response of an asset price (in our
case the exchange rate) to a nonpolicy shock (in our case a surprise in in-
ﬂation) can tell us something about how monetary policy is conducted.
This chapter makes a theoretical point and provides some empirical sup-
port for this point. We show in a simple, but robust, theoretical monetary
exchange rate model that the sign of the covariance between an inﬂation
surprise and the nominal exchange rate can tell us something about how
monetary policy is conducted. Speciﬁcally, we show that “bad news” about
371
9
Is Bad News about Inﬂation Good
News for the Exchange Rate? 
And, If So, Can That Tell Us
Anything about the Conduct 
of Monetary Policy?
Richard H. Clarida and Daniel Waldman
Richard H. Clarida is the C. Lowell Harriss Professor of Economics at Columbia Univer-
sity and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Daniel Waldman
is an associate director and senior foreign exchange economist at Barclays Capital.inﬂation—that it is higher than expected—can be “good news” for the
nominal exchange rate—that it appreciates on this news—if the central
bank has an inﬂation target that it implements with a Taylor Rule. This re-
sult at ﬁrst seemed surprising to us because our model is one of inﬂation,
not price level, targeting so that in the model, a shock to inﬂation has a per-
manent eﬀect on the price level. Because purchasing power parity (PPP)
holds in the long run of the model, the nominal exchange rate depreciates
in the long run to an inﬂation shock, even though on impact it can appre-
ciate in response to this shock. We show that in a traditional overshooting
model in which the central bank sets a growth rate for the money stock, the
exchange rate would be expected to depreciate in response to an inﬂation
shock.
The empirical work in this chapter examines point-sampled data on in-
ﬂation announcements and the reaction of nominal exchange rates in ten-
minute windows around these announcements for ten countries and sev-
eral diﬀerent inﬂation measures for the period July 2001, through March
2005. Eight of the countries in our study are inﬂation targeters, and two are
not. When we pool the data, we do in fact ﬁnd that bad news about inﬂa-
tion is indeed good news for the nominal exchange rate, that the results are
statistically signiﬁcant, and that R-squared is substantial, in excess of 0.25
for core measures of inﬂation. We also ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences compar-
ing the inﬂation targeting countries and the two noninﬂation targeting
countries. For the noninﬂation targeting countries, there is no signiﬁcant
impact of inﬂation announcements on the nominal exchange rate, al-
though the estimated sign is, indeed, in line with our story. For each of the
IT countries, the sign is as predicted by the theory and quite signiﬁcant. Fi-
nally, we study two countries, the United Kingdom and Norway, in which
there was a clear regime change during a period when we can obtain data.
We study the granting of independence to the Bank of England in 1997 and
the shift to formal inﬂation targeting by Norway in 2001. For both coun-
tries, the correlation between the exchange rate and the inﬂation surprise
before the regime change reveal that “bad news about inﬂation was bad
news about the exchange rate.” After the regime change, we ﬁnd that, in-
deed, “bad news about inﬂation is good news about the exchange rate.”
9.2 Optimal Monetary Policy in the Open Economy: Some Results
Before we proceed further, it will be useful to review some of the results
from a model of optimal monetary policy and exchange rate determination
in the open economy developed in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002). There
are two countries, each with staggered price setting and facing cost-push
shocks that generate inﬂation inertia. Home and foreign countries produce
diﬀerentiated traded goods—the terms of trade is a key relative price. In-
ternational spillovers arise via a marginal cost/optimal labor supply chan-
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ting as in Calvo. The chapter follows Woodford (2003) and derives the cen-
tral bank welfare function and the optimal monetary policy reaction func-
tion in the open economy from taste, technology, and market clearing
subject to the Calvo pricing constraint. Solving the model under discre-
tion, there are several results that are relevant to the present discussion.
First, optimal monetary policy in each open economy can be formulated
as a Taylor Rule:
(1) i   rr   E  1   b(    ∗),
where i is the nominal interest rate, rr is the time varying real interest rate,
  is inﬂation,  ∗ is the inﬂation target, and E is the expectations operator.
Second, under optimal monetary policy, the Taylor Rule is a function of
deep parameters:
(2) b   [  (1    ) ]ξ(1    )   0,
where   is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,   is the share of im-
ports in the consumption basket, ξ is the elasticity of substitution across
varieties of intermediate inputs to the production of ﬁnal output, and   is
the exogenous persistence in shocks to marginal cost. Third, optimal mon-
etary policy features a ﬂexible exchange rate, but the exchange rate itself
does not enter the reaction function. Fourth, openness has its eﬀects
through the neutral real interest rate and the slope of the Taylor rule. Fifth,
the nominal exchange rate under optimal policy has a unit root as does the
domestic price level, and they are cointegrated so that PPP holds in the
long run.
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) work out in some detail the symmetric,
two-country Nash equilibrium under central bank discretion. They show
that in the symmetric equilibrium, bad news about inﬂation is good news
for the exchange rate. That is, a Phillips curve shock that pushes up actual
(and expected) inﬂation triggers under optimal policy an aggressive rise in
nominal and real interest rates that actually causes the nominal exchange
rate to appreciate. This is so even though in the long run, the nominal ex-
change rate must depreciate in response to an inﬂation shock.
There is a tension. Using uncovered interest parity and long-run PPP we
have (normalizing foreign interest rates and log price levels to zero):
(3) e    Σj 0, Eij   Σj 0,  E j   p 1.
In the long run, the level of the nominal exchange rate must depreciate in
line with PPP in response to an inﬂation shock. Under an inﬂation target-
ing monetary policy of the sort derived by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(2002), after its initial jump, the nominal exchange rate must be depreciat-
ing along the adjustment path (because the home nominal interest rate is
above the world interest rate when inﬂation is above target). However, in re-
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will tend to make the exchange rate weaker. In the Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (2002) theoretical model, optimal monetary policy has the prop-
erty that the rise in interest rates in response to the monetary policy shock
is suﬃciently large to deliver the association between an adverse inﬂation
shock and a nominal currency appreciation.
9.3 Inﬂation Shocks in a Dornbusch Style Model
In a Dornbusch style model with a money growth target, a shock that
pushes up inﬂation will, under plausible circumstances, result in a depre-
ciation of the nominal exchange rate Intuitively, in a Dornbusch model
with a money growth target—but one that accommodates to some extent
an inﬂation shock so that the price level has a unit root—the long-run PPP
anchor tends to make the nominal exchange rate and the price level move
in the same direction whether the shock is to the money supply or to the
Phillips curve. The analysis is straightforward.
We begin with a money demand equation:
(4) m   p      (ee   e),
where   is the interest semielasticity of money demand. Next is a standard
Phillips curve from this literature augmented with an inﬂation shock term ε.
(5) p   p 1      (e   p)   ε
Next is a money growth equation, which features the empirically plausible
feature that inﬂation shocks are at least partially accommodated.
(6) m   m 1    fε 1
Without this feature, the price level would be stationary in the model, at
odds with the vast body of evidence that price levels have a unit root and
that central banks tend to accommodate price level shocks. We could eas-
ily include a permanent shock to the money supply, in which case bad news
about inﬂation would be bad news about the exchange rate as in the text-
book model. Note that the trend rate of growth in the money supply   an-
chors the trend depreciation in the exchange rate. Finally, we note for fu-
ture reference that the ex ante real interest rate satisﬁes by uncovered
interest parity r   qe – q with q   e – p.
We solve the model for the response of e to an inﬂation shock. To illus-
trate our point as simply as possible, we assume that the accommodation
parameter f is such that policy accommodates the inﬂation shock with a
one-period lag, and the model reaches new steady state in one period with
qe   0. We will solve for the unique f that satisﬁes this condition, which ad-
mits an intuitive interpretation. Interestingly, a more general version of
this setup, which allows for gradual accommodation, can feature sunspot
374 Richard H. Clarida and Daniel Waldmanequilibriums. Because the subject of sunspot equilibriums with money
growth targeting is not the subject of this chapter, we stick with the simple
example here.
We can rewrite the model as
(7) m   p      (qe   q)    (pe   p)    q      .
We have
(8) dp      dq.
Thus, if an inﬂation shock causes inﬂation, the real exchange rate must ap-
preciate under this policy rule. Actual inﬂation must satisfy
(9) dp   dq   dε.
Collecting terms, under full accommodation (with a lag of one period),
(10)  1    
 
 
  dp   dε.
Thus, indeed, an inﬂation shock causes inﬂation, so we know the real ex-
change rate appreciates. The appreciation dampens the impact of the in-
ﬂation shock so that inﬂation rises less than one for one with the inﬂation
shock. Even with ex ante full accommodation, in the period of the shock,
the money supply is ﬁxed which results in a contraction in demand. Now,
what about the nominal exchange rate? Because PPP holds in the long run,
and policy fully accommodates the shock with a lag, the price level will be
permanently higher and, thus, the exchange rate will be permanently
higher (weaker) too.
There is a presumption that the nominal exchange rate will depreciate on
impact. And, in fact, it almost certainly will in this textbook model. To see
this, note that





Now   is the interest semielasticity of money demand, which in empirical
studies is usually estimated to be much larger than 1 and in calibration mod-
els is often assumed to exceed 5. For example, if the interest elasticity of
money demand is 0.5, then starting from an interest rate of 4 percent, a 1
percentage point rise in the interest rate is a 25 percent increase in that rate
and will reduce money demand by 12.5 percent for a semielasticity of 12.5
Thus, there is a presumption that that “bad news about inﬂation is bad
news about the exchange rate” in a textbook model, both in the long run
and on impact in the very short run. Finally, note that for the expectation
of full accommodation to be rational, the central bank must set
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bank, there is a unique value of the feedback parameter f that insures this
is a rational expectation equilibrium. Note also that even though this cen-
tral bank is a money targeter, an inﬂation shock will induce the ex ante real
interest rate to rise since by uncovered interest parity (UIP), in the period
of the shock:
(13) dr    dq   (    ) 1dε.
Thus, a rise in nominal and real interest rates in response to an inﬂation
shock, which is a feature of a stable Taylor rule in a wide variety of models,
is also true under money growth targeting with partial accommodation.
9.4 Exchange Rate Dynamics under Open Economy Taylor Rules
9.4.1 Overview
In Dornbusch (1976) and Mussa (1982), and in virtually all exchange
rate papers written until quite recently—including the “new open econ-
omy” contributions of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996, 2000) and the many
other papers recently surveyed and reviewed in Sarno and Taylor (2001)—
it is the (stochastic process for) the supply of money that is the key nomi-
nal forcing variable for understanding the dynamics of the nominal ex-
change rate. Although Mussa (1982), in particular, allows for a quite
general speciﬁcation of the stochastic process for the money supply, in
practice, theoretical exchange rate models are almost always solved under
quite simple—and counterfactual—restrictions on monetary policy,
namely, that the instrument of monetary policy is the stock of money.
However, for most of the world’s major central banks, the empirical evi-
dence in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) suggests that monetary policy is
better described by an interest rate rule of the sort ﬁrst proposed by Hen-
derson and McKibbon (1990) and Taylor (1993). Recent papers by Engel
and West (2005, 2006) and by Mark (2004) have begun to explore some of
the empirical implications for exchange rates if central banks follow Tay-
lor rules for setting interest rates.
The goal of the next two sections is to characterize exchange rate dy-
namics in a more or less standard open economy model in which the cen-
tral bank follows an interest rate rule to implement an inﬂation targeting
strategy. The key to solving the model in closed form is to recognize that—
as shown in Campbell and Clarida (1987)—if the equilibrium ex ante real
interest rate implied by the Taylor rule exhibits ﬁrst order autoregressive
dynamics, then the equilibrium level of the real exchange rate will, period
by period, be proportional to the equilibrium ex ante real interest rate.
However, the “constant” of proportionality that links the real exchange
rate and the ex ante real interest rate is not a free parameter. Instead, it is a
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scribes the equilibrium inﬂation process. We show that in this model, con-
ditional on the minimum set of state variables, this ﬁxed point is unique
and that the equilibrium is stationary (more precisely, the Blanchard and
Kahn [1980] conditions for a unique rational expectations equilibrium are
satisﬁed if the Taylor condition is satisﬁed).
Some interesting results are obtained. We ﬁnd that in response to a tem-
porary Phillips curve shock that pushes the inﬂation rate above target, the
nominal exchange rate can either depreciate or appreciate on impact, de-
pending upon how aggressively—as indexed by the Taylor rule slope coeﬃ-
cient on the expected inﬂation gap—the central bank raises real interest
rates to bring inﬂation back to target. Because of inﬂation inertia, this ad-
justment does not happen immediately. We ﬁnd that the equilibrium half-
life of an inﬂation shock (on inﬂation, output, and the real interest rate) is
inversely related to the Taylor rule coeﬃcient on the inﬂation gap and is di-
rectly related to the Taylor rule coeﬃcient on the output gap. Thus, the more
aggressive is the central bank response to an inﬂation shock, the faster the
economy returns to target. However, the more aggressive is the central bank
response to the output gap, the slower the economy returns to target.
We also examine the dynamic eﬀect of a once-and-for-all permanent re-
duction in the central bank inﬂation target. The announcement of a lower
inﬂation target causes the exchange rate to appreciate on impact, inducing
a real appreciation and a recession. Inﬂation falls on impact, but not all the
way to target. Along the adjustment path to the new inﬂation target, the ex-
change rate is depreciating. Thus, the exchange rate overshoots in response
to a “tightening” of monetary policy.
9.4.2 A Model
To illustrate the idea as clearly as possible, we will work with the simplest
model required. It is a simpliﬁed version of the model studied in Svensson
(2000). It is comprised of four equations: an aggregate demand equation,
an aggregate supply equation, a Taylor rule equation, and an uncovered in-
terest parity equation. The economy is small and takes the world interest
rate and world inﬂation as given and equal to 0. The aggregate demand
equation is given by
(14) y    r   (e   p),
where yis log deviation of output from potential, r i– E  1is the ex ante
real interest rate, e is the log nominal exchange rate, and p is the log of the
domestic price level. The aggregate supply equation is given by
(15)     −1   y   ε,
where   p – p–1 and ε is a white noise shock to the Phillips curve. Note
that we assume a high degree of inﬂation inertia so that it is the change in
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Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) prediction that under optimal policy
“bad news is good news” because inﬂation inertia will tend to increase the
long-run eﬀect on the price level of any given inﬂation shock. I assume the
central bank conducts monetary policy by according to the following Tay-
lor rule:
(16) i   E  1   b{    ∗}   ay,
where  ∗ is the central bank inﬂation target and b and a   0. Finally, un-
covered interest parity implies, in real terms, that
(17) e   p   E{e 1   p 1}   r.
We let q   e – p denote the real exchange rate. Note that e    p–1   q.
We solve equation (17) forward as in Campbell and Clarida (1987) and
Svensson (2000) to obtain q   Elimi→  q i – EΣk 0, r k. Thus, the log level
of the real exchange rate equals the expected long-run equilibrium real ex-
change rate minus the expected undiscounted sum of short-term real in-
terest rates. In our model, the long-run log real exchange rate is constant
and equal to 0, so the level of the real exchange rate is given by
(18) q    E∑
k 0, 
r k.
We will “guess”—and later verify—that in equilibrium, the ex ante real
interest rate follows a zero mean AR(1) process so that Er j   d jr with 
0   d   1. As shown in Campbell and Clarida (1987), this implies that







It is sometimes just assumed in models like this (see Ball [1999], for ex-
ample) that the real exchange rate is proportional to the short-term real in-
terest rate. Although our model has this feature in equilibrium, d is not a
“free” parameter but is, in fact, a ﬁxed point (and as well will see, a func-
tion of monetary policy) in the space of expectations for the stochastic pro-
cess that describes equilibrium inﬂation.
By substituting equation (19) into the aggregate demand curve, we ob-
tain y   (2 – d)q. Substituting the Taylor rule into the real exchange rate
equation and using the Phillips curve equation, the system can be written
as two equations in two unknowns, q and  :
(20) q    ,
(21)      1   (2   d)q   ε.
a(2   d)q
  
(1   d)
 b(    ∗)
  
(1   d)
378 Richard H. Clarida and Daniel WaldmanFrom equation (20), we see that –q[(1 – d)   a(2 – d)]   r[1   a(2 – d)/(1 –
d)]   b(  –  ∗). Thus, in equilibrium, the ex ante real interest rate is pro-
portional to the inﬂation gap, even though the central bank also seeks to
stabilize output. The dynamics of the system are completely described by
the following equation:
(22)      1    ε.
Before moving on, it is useful to pause and understand the logic. To ob-
tain equation (22), we guessed that the equilibrium ex ante real interest rate
follows an AR(1) process so that Er j djr. Equation (22) shows that if this
guess is correct, inﬂation follows an AR(1) process. But, from the Taylor
rule, if inﬂation follows an AR(1) process, then so does the ex ante real in-
terest rate. Thus, our guess is not logically inconsistent. However, this logic
does not prove that there exists a unique ﬁxed point in the space of expec-
tations over the AR(1) process for r. Collecting terms, we can rewrite equa-
tion (22) as (  –  ∗){1   (2 – d)b/[(1 – d)   a(2 – d)]}   ( –1 –  ∗)   ε. It
follows that any ﬁxed point in the space of expectations for r must satisfy
{1   (2 – d)b/[(1 – d)   a(2 – d)]}   1/d. The solutions to this equation are
just eigenvalues of the dynamic system when written out in Blanchard-
Kahn form. It is easy to show that for any a   0, b   0 is necessary and
suﬃcient for the existent of a unique rational expectations equilibrium.
Figure 9.1 presents the determination of this unique equilibrium.
Result 1: A rational expectations equilibrium exists, is unique, and is sta-
tionary. The equilibrium persistence d(b, a) in inﬂation and in deviations
from PPP 0   d(b, a)   1 depends upon the parameters of monetary pol-
icy. Persistence is strictly decreasing in b—the Taylor rule coeﬃcient on the
inﬂation gap—and strictly increasing in a—the Taylor rule coeﬃcient on
the output gap.
Thus, for any given Taylor rule coeﬃcients a   0 and b   0, there is a
unique, stationary rational expectations equilibrium. The more aggres-
sively the central bank reacts to the inﬂation gap (as indexed by the pa-
rameter b), the faster the economy converges to the long-run equilibrium
and the less persistent are deviations from PPP. However, the larger the
weight placed on output stabilization (as indexed by the parameter a), the
slower the economy converges to the long-run equilibrium. Indeed, it is
easy to establish the following three limiting cases: ﬁrst, for any given a, 
as b → 0, d (b, a) → 1. That is, as the weight placed on inﬂation stabiliza-
tion goes to zero, inﬂation and the real exchange rate approach a random
walk. Second, for any given a, as b →  , d (b, a) → 0. That is, as the weight
placed on inﬂation stabilization goes to inﬁnity, the inﬂation gap and the
real exchange rate approach white noise. Third, for any given b, as a →  ,
(2   d)b(    ∗)
   
(1   d)   a(2   d)
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ﬁnity, inﬂation and the real exchange rate approach a random walk.
An Adverse Inﬂation Shock
A temporary Phillips curve shock ε   0 pushes up inﬂation, but by less
than the shock. This is because the central bank reacts to the inﬂation
shock by pushing up the nominal and the ex ante real interest rate. The real
exchange rate appreciates on impact. Output contracts. The eﬀect of a
Phillips curve shock on the level of the nominal exchange rate depends
upon b, the Taylor rule reaction parameter to the inﬂation gap. The fol-
lowing result is easily veriﬁed using equation (20) and the fact that d is de-
creasing in b.
Result 2: For any given a   0, there exists a b (a) such that, for all b   b(a),
∂et/∂εt   0. That is, if the central bank responds suﬃciently aggressively to
a rise in inﬂation, the nominal exchange rate appreciates on impact in re-
sponse to an adverse inﬂation shock. For b   b(a), ∂et/∂εt   0.
Thus, while the real exchange rate must appreciate in response to an ad-
verse inﬂation shock, the eﬀect on the nominal exchange rate depends
upon the Taylor rule reaction function. Interestingly, the “inﬂation nutter”
case a   0 and b   0 is not suﬃcient to guarantee ∂et/∂εt   0.
The impulse response dynamics to an adverse inﬂation shock are easy to
characterize and are shown in ﬁgures 9.2and 9.3. The nominal interest rate
and inﬂation fall monotonically over time at rate d to  ∗, and the output
gap and the real exchange rate rise monotonically over time at rate d to 0.
Along the adjustment path, the nominal exchange rate is depreciating at
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Fig. 9.1 Equilibrium as a function of Taylor rule parameters b and athe rate equal to the nominal interest rate, until in the steady state it de-
preciates at the rate  ∗.
A Cut in the Inﬂation Target
We now consider a once-and-for-all cut in the inﬂation target to    
∗  ∗.
In our model, this is assumed to be immediately credible and to shape ex-
pectations on impact. That is, following McCallum (1983), the minimum 
set of state variables for this model is s   {   
∗, ε,  −1}. As shown in the pre-
ceding, there is a unique rational expectations equilibrium corresponding
to this state vector and the parameters a and b, which maps s → { , y, q, i,
E  1}. Of course, in equilibrium the nominal exchange rate and the price
level are non-stationary and are a function of { ∗, ε, ε–1, ε–2,...}.
Assume for concreteness that  −1   ∗ and ε   0. In the period in which
the inﬂation target is cut, the equation for inﬂation in the period of the
regime change can be written
(23)   d ∗     
∗ (1   d).
Thus, because of inﬂation inertia, 0   ∂ /∂   
∗   1 because d(a, b)   1 for
b. It follows that the derivative of the inﬂation gap with respect to the inﬂa-
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Fig. 9.2 Impulse response to inﬂation shock: “good news” case b > b(a)tion target is given by ∂(  –    
∗)/∂   
∗   –d. Thus, a cut in the inﬂation tar-
get leads to a rise in the inﬂation gap. By the Taylor rule, the ex ante real in-
terest rate must rise, and, thus, the real exchange rate must appreciate. As a
result, output declines. Indeed, it is the induced decline in output that re-
duces inﬂation part of the way to    
∗. Because inﬂation falls and the real ex-
change rate appreciates, the nominal exchange rate must appreciate as well.
We now discuss the impulse response dynamics in periods subsequent to
the cut in the inﬂation target. For concreteness, we focus on the case in
which the new inﬂation target is zero,    
∗   0. After the regime change, the
nominal interest rate remains above its new steady state level of iSS    
∗ 
0. This is because the inﬂation gap is positive. Thus, along the adjustment
path, the nominal interest rate is everywhere above the world interest rate
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Fig. 9.3 Impulse response to inﬂation shock: “bad news” case b < b(a)of i∗   0 so that the nominal exchange rate must depreciate along the ad-
justment path. 
Result 3: In response to a cut in the inﬂation target, the nominal exchange
rate exhibits overshooting. That is, it appreciates on impact and depreci-
ates over time to its new steady state level.
Thus, if the “surprise” fall in inﬂation is due to a cut in the inﬂation tar-
get (not a Phillips curve shock), good news for inﬂation (that it falls) is
good news for the exchange rate (it appreciates on impact). Because the
model is symmetric, it will also be the case that if a “surprise” rise in inﬂa-
tion is due to an increase in the inﬂation target (not a Phillips curve shock),
bad news for inﬂation (that it rises) is bad news for the exchange rate (it de-
preciates on impact).
9.5 Empirical Results
In this section, we use data on inﬂation announcements and the response
of nominal exchange rates around these announcements to empirically test
our theoretical model. We focus on three questions: (1) What is the sign of
the correlation between inﬂation surprises and nominal exchange rate
changes? (2) Is it signiﬁcant? (3) Is it diﬀerent for inﬂation targeters and
noninﬂation targeters?
Previewing our results, we ﬁnd that when we pool the data, bad news
about inﬂation is good news for the exchange rate. The sign of the correla-
tion between inﬂation surprises and exchange rate changes is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant. When we separate the data into inﬂation targeters
and noninﬂation targeters, we ﬁnd that these results continue to hold for
inﬂation targeting countries, but the coeﬃcients become insigniﬁcant for
noninﬂation targeters.
9.5.1 Data
Our data set consists of high frequency exchange rate and inﬂation ex-
pectation and announcement data. In the following, we describe the con-
struction and properties of our data.
Exchange Rate Data
Our exchange rate data consists of continuously recorded ﬁve-minute
nominal spot data for nine U.S. dollar crosses: USD-JPY, USD-CAD,
USD-NOK, USD-SEK, USD-CHF, EUR-USD, GBP-USD, AUD-USD,
and NZD-USD. The data, provided by Olsen Associates and Merrill
Lynch, begins in July 2001, and ends in December 2005. For GBP-USD
and USD-NOK, we also have high frequency exchange rate data covering
the periods 1993 to 1996 and 1997 to 2000, respectively.
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changes. Although the spot data is recorded at ﬁve-minute intervals, we use
ten-minute changes because we are interested in exchange rate behavior
during the period beginning ﬁve minutes before an inﬂation announce-
ment and ending ﬁve minutes after such an announcement.
Table 9.1 provides summary statistics for our ten-minute exchange rate
return data. For all nine U.S. dollar crosses, the mean ten-minute return is
0.00 percent. Although the mean returns are similar across currency pairs,
the standard deviations are not, ranging from 0.05 percent to 0.09 percent.
The range of standard deviations may be related to the depth and liquidity
of markets in diﬀerent exchange rate crosses. The most liquid currency
pairs—USD-JPY, EUR-USD, and USD-CAD—have the lowest standard
deviations, and the least liquid crosses—NZD-USD, AUD-USD, USD-
NOK, and USD-SEK—have the highest standard deviations.
Inﬂation Data
We deﬁne an inﬂation surprise as the diﬀerence between the market ex-
pectation for an announcement and the announced value of inﬂation. We
arrange the data so that a positive surprise indicates that inﬂation was
higher than expected, while a negative surprise indicates that inﬂation was
announced lower than expected.
For the 2001 to 2005 period, our inﬂation expectations data is from the
Bloomberg News Service. Bloomberg surveys commercial and investment
banks on their expectations for a wide range of macroeconomic an-
nouncements, including inﬂation. We use the median of these expectations
as the inﬂation expectation for a particular announcement.
Our inﬂation announcement data for 2001 to 2005 is from the Bloomberg
News Service as well. Bloomberg records and preserves the announced
value of macroeconomic variables, in addition to the revised values. This is
an important distinction, as macroeconomic data is often revised in the
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Table 9.1 10-minute exchange rate returns (%)
AUD-USD NZD-USD EUR-USD
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00
Standard deviation 0.07 0.09 0.05
GBP-USD USD-JPY USD-CAD
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00
Standard deviation 0.05 0.05 0.05
USD-NOK USD-SEK USD-CHF
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00
Standard deviation 0.07 0.07 0.06months following its initial release. Because we are concerned only with the
immediate response of the exchange rate to an inﬂation surprise, we need
the actually announced data.
In addition to the 2001 to 2005 data, we have inﬂation expectation and
announcement data for the United Kingdom and Norway for the periods
1993 to 1996 and 1997 to 2000, respectively. Data for both is provided by
Money Market Services and is similar to the Bloomberg data.
For all countries except the United Kingdom, where we use retail prices,
we use consumer prices as our inﬂation metric. For most countries in our
sample, expectation and announcement data are available for both head-
line and core inﬂation, where core inﬂation is headline inﬂation minus
some of the volatile components, such as food and energy. We have up to
four diﬀerent measures of inﬂation for each country in our sample: head-
line inﬂation measured as month-over-month and year-over-year changes,
and core inﬂation measured as month-over-month and year-over-year
changes.
In table 9.2, we present summary statistics for our inﬂation surprise vari-
ables. For most countries in the sample, the mean inﬂation surprise is
slightly less than zero, indicating that forecasters have tended to underes-
timate inﬂation. However, across all countries and measures of inﬂation,
the absolute value of mean inﬂation surprises is never greater than 0.1 per-
centage points, indicating that any potential bias is small. The standard de-
viations for the inﬂation surprises are larger than the means, ranging from
0.1 to 0.3 percentage points.
9.5.2 The Model
We follow the macroeconomic announcement surprise literature, esti-
mating the following equation:
(24) Rt      St   ut.
Here Rt is the ten-minute return around the inﬂation announcement, St is
the inﬂation surprise, and ut is the error term. The exchange rate return is
calculated so that a positive value indicates an appreciation of the local
currency, and a negative value represents a depreciation of the local cur-
rency. In all tables, the coeﬃcient represents the percentage change in the
local currency for a 1 percentage point surprise in inﬂation.
All Countries
Pooling data from all countries in our sample and running a stacked or-
dinary least squares (OLS) regression on equation (24), we ﬁnd that bad
news about inﬂation is indeed good news for the nominal exchange rate.
For all four speciﬁcations (table 9.3), the sign on the inﬂation surprise vari-
able is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that higher than ex-
pected inﬂation results in an immediate currency appreciation and that
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Canada United Kingdom
Headline Core Headline Core
MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY
Mean –0.04 –0.04 –0.03 –0.01 0.00 –0.01 –0.02 –0.02
Standard deviation 0.21 0.23 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.14
Norway Sweden
Headline Core Headline Core
MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY
Mean –0.07 –0.09 –0.09 –0.10 –0.03 –0.05 –0.03 –0.03
Standard deviation 0.27 0.30 0.22 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.19
Japan United States
Headline Core Headline Core
MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY
Mean 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 –0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00
Standard deviation 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.18 0.10 0.12
Australia Euro area New Zealand Switzerland
Headline Headline Headline Headline
QoQ YoY MoM YoY QoQ MoM YoY
Mean –0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 –0.04 –0.03 –0.07
Standard deviation 0.18 0.19 0.09 0.07 0.16 0.20 0.23
Table 9.3 All countries
Headline Core
MoM YoY MoM YoY
Coeﬃcient 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5
T-statistic 5.9 6.2 9.7 9.2
R-squared 0.08 0.09 0.27 0.25
No. of observations 394 387 257 259
Notes:Regression method: stacked OLS. Percentage change in exchange rate results from a 1
percentage point upward surprise in inﬂation. Positive coeﬃcient indicates appreciation of
domestic currency. Countries: Australia, Canada, euro area, Japan, New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. Data: July 2001–December 2005.
Some countries missing observations.lower than expected inﬂation results in an immediate currency deprecia-
tion. The R-squares from the regressions are substantial, particularly for
the speciﬁcations using core inﬂation, where they exceed 0.25.
Although the signs are positive and signiﬁcant for all speciﬁcations, the
results are stronger for the core measures. The coeﬃcients, t-statistics, and
R-squares are all larger, with coeﬃcients 2.5 times the size of those in the
regressions using headline inﬂation and R-squares nearly three times
greater. Given the tendency of central banks to focus on core inﬂation, it is
not surprising that markets have reacted more strongly to surprises in this
measure.
Inﬂation Targeters versus Noninﬂation Targeters
Our ten-country sample includes eight inﬂation targeters and two non-
inﬂation targeters—the United States and Japan. Our groupings are simi-
lar to those used by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), though the
IMF does not include the European Central Bank (ECB) among inﬂation
targeters, as the ECB gives weight to a “reference value” for growth of
money supply in the euro area. Despite this dual mandate, we include the
ECB in the inﬂation targeting group, as it has lessened its emphasis on the
money supply reference value in recent years. Including the ECB among
the noninﬂation targeters would not signiﬁcantly alter our results.
For our study, the key question is whether the sign and signiﬁcance of  
are diﬀerent for inﬂation targeters and noninﬂation targeters. Separating
and pooling the data into two categories—inﬂation targeters and non-
inﬂation targeters—we ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two. For
noninﬂation targeting countries, the impact of inﬂation surprises is not sig-
niﬁcant, though the estimated sign is generally positive (table 9.4). For in-
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Table 9.4 Inﬂation targeters versus noninﬂation targeters
Inﬂation targeters Noninﬂation targeters
Headline Core Headline Core
MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY
Coeﬃcient 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.01 –0.08 0.1 0.1
T-statistic 6.1 6.7 9.4 8.9 0.2 –0.8 1.3 1.1
R-squared 0.11 0.13 0.37 0.31 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02
No. of observations 286 310 152 182 108 77 105 77
Notes: Regression method: stacked OLS. Percentage change in exchange rate resulting from a 1 per-
centage point upward surprise in inﬂation. Positive coeﬃcient indicates appreciation of domestic cur-
rency. Inﬂation targeters include: Australia, Canada, euro area, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, and United Kingdom. Noninﬂation targeters include: Japan and United States. Noninﬂa-
tion targeters YoY includes only Japan. Data: July 2001–December 2005. Number of observations may
be less than total months due to missing observations.ﬂation targeters, the estimated coeﬃcients are positive and statistically sig-
niﬁcant in all four speciﬁcations. The R-squares are quite substantial for
the inﬂation targeting regressions, exceeding 0.30 for both core speciﬁca-
tions (table 9.4).
Estimating equation (24) separately for each country conﬁrms these re-
sults (table 9.5). For the two noninﬂation targeters, the coeﬃcients are not
signiﬁcant, and for headline inﬂation in the United States are actually of
the opposite sign of what the theory predicts. For all eight inﬂation tar-
geters, the estimated signs are positive and are statistically signiﬁcant for
six of the countries. These results are particularly strong for the core mea-
sures, with R-squares ranging from 0.18 for the United Kingdom to 0.65
for Norway.
Regime Changes
We can also test whether our results hold when there is a clear regime
change over time. To test this, we study the granting of independence to the
Bank of England in 1997 and the shift to formal inﬂation targeting in Nor-
way in 2001. For both countries, we have nominal exchange rate and inﬂa-
tion expectation and announcement data prior to and following the regime
shifts.
For both countries, the correlation between inﬂation surprises and nom-
inal exchange rate changes is positive and signiﬁcant for the 2001 to 2005
period, indicating that when central banks in both countries were inﬂation
targeters, bad news about inﬂation was good news for the exchange rate.
However, prior to the regime changes in both countries, the estimated co-
eﬃcients were negative (though not statistically signiﬁcant), implying that
bad news about inﬂation was bad news for the exchange rate (table 9.6).
Sign Eﬀects
Finally, we examine whether the reaction of the nominal exchange rate
diﬀers according to the sign of the surprise. We separate the data into three
categories: higher than expected inﬂation, lower than expected inﬂation,
and as expected inﬂation. We discard observations where inﬂation was as
expected and pool the remaining data for all countries into two groups—
positive inﬂation surprises (bad news) and negative inﬂation surprises
(good news). We then estimate equation (24) for both (table 9.7), though
we omit the constant in the regression.
Doing so, we ﬁnd that although the coeﬃcients are positive and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant across all speciﬁcations, the eﬀect is stronger for negative
inﬂation surprises (good news) than it is for positive inﬂation surprises
(bad news). The coeﬃcients, t-statistics, and R-squares are substantially
higher for the regressions that use negative inﬂation surprises. Thus, for
equivalent inﬂation surprises, good news will have a larger impact than will
bad news.
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Canada United Kingdom
Headline Core Headline Core
MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY
Coeﬃcient 0.07 0.04 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3
T-statistic
OLS 1.2 0.8 5.0 3.3 2.9 3.1 3.3 4.0
White 1.4 1.0 6.3 2.8 2.2 2.6 2.8 3.3
Newey-West 1.2 0.9 6.7 2.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.7
R-squared 0.02 0.01 0.47 0.19 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.23
No. of observations 54 54 30 50 53 54 50 54
Norway Sweden
Headline Core Headline Core
MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY
Coeﬃcient 0.5 0.6 1.3 1.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
T-statistic
OLS 2.8 3.5 7.5 7.7 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.1
White 2.3 2.4 5.7 5.4 3.6 3.0 3.3 3.2
Newey-West 2.0 2.1 6.6 5.7 3.4 3.1 2.9 2.9
R-squared 0.19 0.27 0.65 0.64 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.20
No. of observations 35 35 32 35 41 42 40 42
Australia Euro Area New Zealand Switzerland
Headline Headline Headline Headline
QoQ YoY MoM YoY QoQ MoM YoY
Coeﬃcient 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.1
T-statistic
OLS 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.9 3.0 2.9 3.1
White 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.0 3.3 2.7 3.0
Newey-West 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 3.2 2.7 3.4
R-squared 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.38 0.16 0.16
No. of observations 18 17 54 54 17 48 53
Japan United States
Headline Core Headline Core
MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY
Coeﬃcient 0.07 0.1 0.07 0.07 –0.1 –0.2 0.1 0.2
T-statistic
OLS 1.4 1.8 1.0 0.7 –0.4 –1.1 0.9 0.7
White 1.2 1.9 0.8 0.7 –0.4 –1.1 0.9 0.7
Newey-West 1.3 1.6 0.7 0.7 –0.4 –1.2 0.9 0.8
R-squared 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.02
No. of observations 54 54 51 52 54 25 54 25
Notes: Percentage change in exchange rate results from a 1 percentage point upward surprise in inﬂa-
tion. Positive coeﬃcient indicates appreciation of domestic currency. For U.S. results, currency appreci-
ation/depreciation is measured against the euro. Data: July 2001–December 2005. Number of observa-
tions may be less than total months due to missing observations. White and Newey-West used to correct
for potential heteroscedasticity.9.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have presented what is apparently a new empirical
regularity—that for inﬂation targeting countries, bad news for inﬂation is
good news for the exchange rate. There are two antecedents for this empir-
ical ﬁnding of which we are aware. The paper by Anderson et al. (2003) who
report in their tables but don’t discuss, that for some dollar exchange rates
during the 1990s, inﬂation surprises and exchange rates covaried in the way
reported in this chapter, but the estimated eﬀects were not signiﬁcant. In
Goldberg and Klein (2006), it is shown that for most of the sample 1999 to
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Table 9.6 UK and Norway preinﬂation targeting
UK Norway
Headline Core Headline
MoM YoY YoY YoY
Coeﬃcient 0.006 –0.05 –0.06 –0.08
T-statistic
OLS 0.1 –0.5 –0.7 –1.0
White 0.1 –0.7 –0.8 –1.6
Newey-West 0.1 –1.1 –1.4 –1.6
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
No. of observations 46 46 46 40
Notes: Percentage change in exchange rate results from a 1 percentage point upward surprise
in inﬂation. Positive coeﬃcient indicates appreciation of domestic currency. Dates: Norway
(August 1997–December 2000); United Kingdom (March 1993–December 1996). Number of
observations may be less than total months due to missing observations. White and Newey-
West used to correct for potential heteroscedasticity.
Table 9.7 Good news versus bad news
Headline Core
MoM YoY MoM YoY
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
Coeﬃcient 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.6
T-statistic 2.4 5.1 2.5 5.4 4.9 7.1 4.1 7.2
No. of observations 126 164 113 169 80 98 83 102
Notes: Regression method: stacked OLS. Percentage change in exchange rate results from a 1 percent-
age point upward surprise in inﬂation. Positive coeﬃcient indicates appreciation of domestic currency.
Countries: Australia, Canada, Euro area, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, and United States. Data: July 2001–December 2005. Number of observations may be less
than total months due to missing observations. Positive indicates inﬂation higher than expected—bad
news. Negative indicates inﬂation lower than expected—good news.2005, bad news about inﬂation was bad news for the euro but that bad news
about inﬂation become good news for the euro starting in 2003. They in-
terpret this as consistent with improved ECB credibility during the period.
Faust et al. (forthcoming) look at fourteen years of data for the United
States and ﬁnd that bad news about inﬂation is bad news for the exchange
rate. Our ﬁndings are also related to but distinct from those in the much
cited paper by Engel and Frankel (1984) and the paper of Hardouvelis
(1984). They looked at the eﬀect of money supply surprises (not inﬂation
surprises) on the exchange rate. They argued that if a money growth tar-
geting regime were credible, then a surprise increase in the money supply—
that pushed money growth above target—would be expected to be reversed
and that this would cause the nominal exchange rate to appreciate, which
is, in fact, what they found for the Fed and the dollar in the early 1980s. We
have presented a simple theoretical model that delivers the prediction that
under certain inﬂation targeting regimes, bad news about inﬂation can be
good news for the exchange rate. This is a workhorse model that does not
require the two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium frame-
work with optimal monetary policy as featured in Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (2002), and yet it delivers a similar prediction. What can these re-
sults tell us about monetary policy? They suggest two conclusions. First,
the inﬂation targeting regimes in the countries featured in our sample are
suﬃciently credible in that they anchor expectations of inﬂation and the
monetary policy path required to achieve the inﬂation target to such an ex-
tent that the currency becomes more valuable upon receipt of news that in-
ﬂation is surprising high. This credibility eﬀect has to be strong enough to
counterbalance the long-run PPP anchor, which would tend to depreciate
the currency on the impact of bad inﬂation news. We note that this is ex-
actly what we ﬁnd for the Bank of England before independence and for
Norway before the adoption of inﬂation targeting. A second conclusion is
that a credible inﬂation target is not enough for the “bad news is good
news” eﬀect to prevail. In other words, we cannot conclude that if bad news
about inﬂation is bad news for the exchange rate, that a central bank is not
an inﬂation targeter. The central bank must raise interest rates suﬃciently
aggressively to an inﬂation shock, and not just greater than one for one as
required by the Taylor principle. In particular, this observation is impor-
tant for correctly interpreting the results for the United States and Japan,
for which we did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of the “bad news is good
news” eﬀect. Especially in the case of the Fed, we do not interpret our re-
sults necessarily as evidence against Fed credibility in anchoring inﬂation
expectations. They are also consistent with the Fed’s anchoring those ex-
pectations in the context of its dual mandate.
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This chapter is a very nice contribution, not only to our understanding
about monetary policy, but also to our understanding about exchange
rates. The key ﬁnding of the chapter is that in inﬂation targeting countries,
an announcement of higher inﬂation leads to a stronger currency. At ﬁrst
this might seem puzzling—doesn’t inﬂation weaken a currency? But
clearly markets believe that the central bank in the inﬂation targeting coun-
try will react to news of higher inﬂation by raising real interest rates.
Higher real interest rates strengthen the currency.
The evidence in the chapter is strong—only in inﬂation targeting coun-
tries do we consistently see a relation between announcements of higher in-
ﬂation and a stronger currency. Indeed, in England and Norway, there is
evidence that the eﬀect changed as the countries changed monetary policy
to inﬂation targeting.
The fact that news of higher inﬂation leads to a stronger currency is not
a new result. This is precisely the point that Engel and West (2006) high-
lighted in their model of exchange rate behavior based on Taylor rules. It is
easy to understand the eﬀect using the present value formulation for the
real exchange rate as in Engel and West. To see this, simply substitute equa-
tion (16) of Clarida and Waldman into their equation (18) to get:
(1) qt    Et∑
 
j   0
[b( t j    ∗)   ayt j].
Here, assuming symmetric Taylor rules in the home and foreign country,  t
is the home inﬂation rate relative to the foreign inﬂation rate, and yt is the
home output gap relative to the foreign output gap. The real exchange rate,
qt, is deﬁned in such a way that a decline in the real exchange rate is a home
real appreciation.
Denote the exchange rate immediately before the announcement as qt–,
and immediately after qt . Then we have:
(2) qt    qt    (Et    Et )  ∑
 
j   0
(b t   j   ayt   j) .
If the market learns current inﬂation is higher, and if there is some persist-
ence to inﬂation, then qt must fall.
Engel and West (2006) measure inﬂation surprises (and output gap sur-
prises) using a vector autoregression (VAR) in inﬂation, output gap, and
interest rates. They construct a “model” real exchange rate by constructing
the present value in equation (l) and compare its behavior to the actual real
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a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.exchange rate.1 One of the key ﬁndings is that, as predicted, positive inﬂa-
tion surprises (in the home relative to the foreign country) lead to a real ap-
preciation.
I very much like the Clarida-Waldman approach. An obvious short-
coming of the Engel-West approach is that the measure of inﬂation sur-
prise (and our output gap surprise) is inferred from the VAR. What we
want to measure is the surprise to the market. Undoubtedly, the market
uses much more information in constructing forecasts than is included in
the Engel-West VAR. The “event study” approach of Clarida and Wald-
man gives us a very crisp measure of the surprise—the diﬀerence between
the actual announced inﬂation and the expectation of that announcement
as collected by Bloomberg News Service from professional forecasters.
Clarida and Waldman mention the relationship of their method to my
study with Frankel many years ago (Engel and Frankel 1984.) We looked
at the eﬀects of announcements of the money supply in the United States
in the early 1980s on the value of the dollar. Like Clarida and Waldman, we
related the change in the exchange rate to the diﬀerence between the an-
nounced value of the money supply and the expected value of the an-
nounced money supply as calculated from a survey of forecasters. The ﬂa-
vor of the ﬁnding is similar—we found that an unexpectedly high money
supply led to an appreciation of the currency. Why? Because it indicated
that the central bank was likely to react to this announcement by con-
tracting the money supply. Indeed, we also found that short-term interest
rates reacted positively to the money surprise. In the early 1980s, the Fed
(supposedly) had a money supply target, so the reaction of the real ex-
change rate reﬂected the credibility of Fed policy. Likewise, the exchange
rate reaction to news about inﬂation in the Clarida and Waldman chapter
reﬂects credibility of inﬂation targeting central banks.
Clarida and Waldman mention three recent studies that have explicitly
looked at the exchange rate reaction to announcements about inﬂation,
and the results in those studies tend to support the ﬁndings of this chapter.
There actually have been many other papers over the years that have ex-
amined the reaction of exchange rates to macroeconomic announcements.
I will not attempt a survey of them here, but I do want to mention one of
the earlier ones, Hardouvelis (1988). Hardouvelis looks at the reaction of
interest rates and exchange rates to announcements of a number of eco-
nomic variables in the October 1979 to August 1984 period. His ﬁndings
are consistent both with Engel-Frankel and Clarida-Waldman. That is, he
ﬁnds that the dollar consistently and signiﬁcantly appreciates in response
to positive surprises in the money supply, as in Engel-Frankel, and as we
would expect if the Fed were credibly targeting the money stock. But the
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1. Engel and West (2006) actually construct a discounted present value because the Taylor
rule in one country includes a term for the real exchange rate. Mark (2007) considers a model
very much like that in equation (1).reaction of the dollar to announcements of the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) and purchasing power parity (PPI) inﬂation is mixed. Across seven
exchange rates, the sign of the response varies and is never statistically sig-
niﬁcant. As in the Clarida-Waldman chapter, bad news about inﬂation is
not good news for the currency if the central bank is not inﬂation-targeting.
Although Clarida and Waldman emphasize the usefulness of their ﬁnd-
ings for interpreting the credibility of inﬂation targeting central banks, I
think another point worth emphasizing is that the chapter provides empir-
ical support for a fairly standard macroeconomic model of exchange rates.
The important diﬀerence between this and some other empirical models is
that the endogeneity of monetary policy is explicit, but otherwise the build-
ing blocks are familiar. Elsewhere, Ken West and I (Engel and West 2005)
have emphasized that the standard metric for assessing exchange rate mod-
els—can they produce a better out-of-sample forecast of the exchange rate
than the random walk model?—is not appropriate. Under plausible condi-
tions, the models actually imply that exchange rates should approximately
follow a random walk and, therefore, may not be capable of outforecasting
the random walk model.
How, then, should we assess exchange rate models? I think the practical
problem is that exchange rate changes are primarily driven by changes in
expectations. The models pin down which expectations matter—monetary
and real fundamentals. But we have a very hard time measuring the mar-
ket’s expectations. Rational expectations imply that the sample distribu-
tion of realized ex post values of variables should be the same as the ex ante
distribution of agents’ expectations. But in practice, when economic fun-
damentals are very persistent and subject to regime changes, it is diﬃcult
to validate rational expectations models using ex post data.
What is needed, instead, is some more direct way to capture the eﬀects of
changes in expectations. I think the approach of Clarida and Waldman (and
others that use high-frequency responses to announcements) is one excel-
lent way to deal with the problem. The survey data used here are probably
a pretty good measure of expectations. The surveys are taken very close to
the time of the announcement and are asking about expectations of a very
speciﬁc number. The “surprise” in inﬂation measured by Clarida and Wald-
man is probably very highly correlated with the surprise to the market.
The fact that exchange rates react to news about inﬂation precisely the
way the models predict—bad inﬂation news is good news for the currency
of countries with inﬂation targeting—is also conﬁrmation of the exchange
rate model.
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Discussion Summary
Jordi Galí said that based on reduced-form regressions and structural vec-
tor autoregressions (VARs) uncovered interest parity was rejected in the
data and that it must, therefore, be the case that the size of the exchange
rate response did not match the size of the interest rate response in the way
that would be implied by uncovered interest parity.
John C. Williamssaid that it would be interesting to look further into the
uncovered interest parity issue—for example, to look at the movements of
interest rates in the two countries and to see whether they also moved as
predicted. He also argued that the particular value of the coeﬃcient on sur-
prise inﬂation in Clarida and Waldman’s regressions did not necessarily re-
late to credibility or lack of credibility, but could reﬂect the particular loss
function of the central bank in question. Clarida agreed that the most that
could be inferred was the strength of the central bank’s response to inﬂa-
tion.
Marvin Goodfriend recalled that in December 2002, the Fed mentioned
deﬂation for the ﬁrst time. The ten-year Treasury yield collapsed. He won-
dered whether this was due to expectations of deﬂation, or to expectations
of a Fed response, and what other asset prices could tell us about this.
Regarding the U.K. evidence, Peter Westaway said that he considered
that the main policy shift had taken place in 1992, when inﬂation targeting
was adopted, rather than in 1997, when the Bank of England was made in-
dependent. Clarida replied that the authors used the 1997 reform because
it was as close as possible to an unanticipated regime change. Westaway
wondered what results would be obtained with other types of policy rule.
Clarida said that in some sense, a Taylor rule could never be disentangled
from a suﬃciently complicated money rule. Westaway concluded by saying
that over long periods, uncovered interest parity did not work well. On the
other hand, at the time scale of individual days, it worked well, especially
in response to classic monetary shocks.
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